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Abstract: We critically engage two traditional views of scientific data and outline a novel 
philosophical view that we call the pragmatic-representational (PR) view of data.  On the PR 
view, data are representations that are the product of a process of inquiry, and they should be 
evaluated in terms of their adequacy or fitness for particular purposes.  Some important 
implications of the PR view for data assessment, related to misrepresentation, context-
sensitivity, and complementary use, are highlighted.  The PR view provides insight into the 
common but little-discussed practices of iteratively reusing and repurposing data, which 
result in many datasets' having a phylogeny—an origin and complex evolutionary history—
that is relevant to their evaluation and future use.  We relate these insights to the open-data 
and data-rescue movements, and highlight several future avenues of research that build on the 
PR view of data.   
 
1. Introduction 
Philosophers of science now commonly understand theoretical models to be 
representations of real or imagined targets, with a variety of nuanced perspectives on how 
best to understand the nature of this representational relationship (e.g., Frigg and Nguyen 
2017; Frigg and Hartmann 2020).  In conjunction with the rise of this representational 
perspective, there has also been in recent decades a pragmatic turn: many philosophers now 
emphasize that scientific modeling is an activity undertaken by agents with specific goals and 
purposes in mind, such as the prediction or explanation of a particular phenomenon.  That is, 
models are not just representations; they are also tools, which are constructed or selected, and 
manipulated, with an eye toward achieving specific epistemic or practical purposes (e.g., 
Morrison and Morgan 1999; Giere 2004, 2010; Boon and Knuuttila 2009; Parker 2010; 
Knuuttila 2011; Currie 2018; Boon 2020).  A closely-related view of model evaluation 
proposes that models be judged in terms of their adequacy or fitness for particular purposes, 
rather than by comparison to some abstract standard of perfect representation (Parker 2010, 
2020a; Currie 2018; see also Teller 2001; NRC 2007; Taper et al. 2008).   
This pragmatic, representational perspective on scientific models has, so far, been 
articulated and adopted almost exclusively in the context of theoretical modeling, where 
model construction often begins from theoretical principles or other general assumptions 
about the workings of a system or phenomenon.  Familiar examples include Newtonian 
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models of the pendulum, fluid dynamical models of earth’s atmosphere, and predator-prey 
models in ecology.  When it comes to another important class of models used in science—
data models—a pragmatic representational view has not yet been similarly developed or 
defended.3  Data models are often described as cleaned-up, smoothed or otherwise-processed 
versions of data (Suppes 1962; Frigg and Hartmann 2020).  Examples include global climate 
datasets synthesized from a huge number of local temperature records, filtered and colored 
astronomical images of galaxies, and graphs showing support for a political candidate over 
time obtained by averaging the results from several polls.4 While data models are sometimes 
characterized as representations (e.g., Harris 2003; Leonelli 2016), the idea that they should 
be evaluated in terms of their adequacy-for-purpose is rarely expressed; the implicit measure 
of quality, both in scientific and philosophical discussions, usually remains that of closeness 
to a perfect mirroring of the world. 
We argue that a pragmatic, representational view should also be adopted in the 
context of data modeling and, indeed, for data themselves.  Our aims in what follows are to 
motivate and outline such a view and to discuss some salient features of data practices from 
its perspective.  In Section 2, we critically examine two common ways of thinking about data 
and data modeling—the mirroring view and the set theoretic view—and motivate the need for 
an alternative understanding of data.  In Section 3, we present our pragmatic-representational 
(PR) view: data and data models are representations that should be evaluated in terms of their 
adequacy for particular purposes. We illustrate this view with an example from climate 
science.  In Section 4, we draw out some significant implications for the practice of data 
assessment, related to misrepresentation, context-sensitivity and complementary use, which 
parallel insights that have emerged from a pragmatic, representational perspective on 
theoretical modelling.  In Section 5, we discuss the dynamic evolution of data models from 
the perspective of the PR view.  In particular, we call attention to the iterative reuse and 
repurposing of data, illustrating with examples from astrophysics.  Such practices reveal that 
data models often have a complex evolutionary history, which can be highly relevant to their 
evaluation.  We draw together these insights of the PR view of data and conclude in Section 
6.   
 
3 Though for a preliminary step in this direction see Bokulich (2018). 
4 We understand data models to differ from what are sometimes called “data-driven” or 
“phenomenological” models. The latter, while developed in light of data, typically take the 
form of mathematical equations that are meant to characterize somewhat general 
relationships among aspects of the target. Data models, by contrast, typically take the form of 
datasets, graphs or images and pertain to what happened at particular times and places.  
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2. Challenging Two Unhelpful Views about Data 
 In developing a philosophical view of data that is accountable to scientific practice, 
there are two extreme positions that we argue are unhelpful.  The first is that data are an 
unmediated window onto the world, whose epistemic reliability is given.  This view fails to 
adequately distinguish data from the world, in effect identifying data with reality and leaving 
little room for the recognition that data can misinform.  At the other extreme is the 
philosophical view that data are abstract set-theoretic structures that can only be related to 
other abstract set-theoretic structures (e.g., via isomorphisms).  This view also fails to 
adequately account for the relationship between data and the world, but this time it is the 
world that is lost.  In this section, we flesh out key problems with each of these views in turn.   
 On the first view, data just are pieces of reality, or, marginally better, they provide 
direct access to reality by reflecting or mirroring it.   This view treats data as both given and 
always epistemically privileged.  While the mirror view guides much of our everyday 
thinking about data, it has long been challenged by philosophers.  Thomas Kuhn, for 
example, famously notes that data are not “the given of experience” but rather “the collected 
with difficulty” (Kuhn 1996 [1962], p. 126).  More recently, this insight has been further 
developed and defended by Sabina Leonelli, who argues that “despite their scientific value as 
‘given,’ data are clearly made. They are the results of complex processes of interaction 
between researchers and the world” (2016, p. 71; see also Humphreys 2013).  The mirror 
view of data has also been challenged by some scientists, such as the theoretical biologist 
Robert Rosen: 
[A]ny measurement, however comprehensive, is an act of abstraction, an act of 
replacing the thing measured (e.g., the natural system . . .) by a limited set of 
numbers.  Indeed, there can be no greater act of abstraction than the collapsing of a 
phenomenon in [nature] down to a single number, the result of a single 
measurement.  From this standpoint, it is ironic indeed that a mere observer regards 
oneself as being in direct contact with reality and that it is ‘theoretical science’ alone 
that deals with abstractions.  (Rosen 1991, p. 60) 
As Rosen rightly points out, the widespread failure to appreciate these abstractions involved 
in the collection and production of data has perpetuated an uncritical view of data. 5 
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process will always involve some omission.   
 
 4 
These insights—that data are constructed through our complex interactions with the 
world, often involving significant abstraction—undermine the naive intuition that we can 
simply identify data with the world.  This is not to say that data have no substantial 
connection to, or anchoring in, reality, but the extent to which any given datum can inform us 
about the world is something that should be assessed and not assumed.  While this latter point 
seems uncontroversial, its full implications for a philosophy of data remain to be fully 
explored.   
 At the other extreme, much of the philosophical work that has been done on data has 
either explicitly or implicitly assumed a view of data that is arguably too disconnected from 
the world.  One of the most influential early papers in the philosophy of data is Patrick 
Suppes’ (1962) “Models of Data.”  In this paper, Suppes introduces the seminal notion of a 
“data model” and the related concept of a hierarchy of models bridging data and theory.  He 
notes that, rather than the “raw” data, what scientists are primarily interested in is a model of 
the data—a processed and abstracted version of the data that has been subjected to 
appropriate statistical and other analysis. 
While Suppes is right to call attention to the central importance of data models, what 
has often been overlooked or unchallenged in subsequent discussions is that Suppes’ view of 
data models is tied specifically to the semantic conception of theories and the corresponding 
“instantial” view of models.6  The notion of model that Suppes adopts when characterizing 
both theoretical and data models is the logician’s notion of a model as a set-theoretic 
structure.  Following Alfred Tarski, he defines a model of a theory, T, as a possible 
realization of T such that all valid sentences of T are satisfied.  A theory, on this semantic 
conception, just is a family of set-theoretic models.  In an earlier article, Suppes writes, “I 
claim that the concept of model in the sense of Tarski may be used without distortion and as a 
fundamental concept in all of the disciplines . . . In this sense I would assert that the meaning 
of the concept of model is the same in mathematics and the empirical sciences” (Suppes 
1960, p. 289).   
Subsequent studies of modeling practice, however, have not born this view out.  
Instead, philosophers today typically characterize theoretical models as representations of 
concrete physical entities, and of course models may even be physical entities themselves (as 
in the case of scale ‘table top’ models) (see, e.g., Bokulich and Oreskes 2017; Frigg and 
 
6 For a discussion of various conceptions of scientific theories (e.g., syntactic, semantic, and 
pragmatic) and critiques of the semantic conception see, for example, Winther (2015) and 
references therein.  
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Nguyen 2017; Frigg and Hartmann 2020).  This representational turn in philosophical 
understanding of scientific models was to a significant extent spurred by the work of Ron 
Giere (1999, 2004, 2010).  In his critique of Suppes’ (1960) paper, he highlights several 
issues in scientific modeling that the logician’s “instantial” view of models is ill-equipped to 
handle, and argues instead for a representational view: “I call my understanding of models 
representational because it takes models not primarily as providing a means for interpreting 
formal systems, but as tools for representing the world” (Giere 1999, p. 44).   
 Giere’s critique, however, centers on the instantial view of theoretical models.  Yet 
Suppes adopts the same instantial view when he speaks of “models of data.”  Suppes writes, 
“Models of the data . . . are then defined . . . in terms of possible realizations of data.  As 
should be apparent, from a logical standpoint possible realizations of data are defined in just 
the same way as possible realizations of the theory” (Suppes 1962, p. 253).  Surprisingly, this 
aspect of Suppes’ view has gone unchallenged (or perhaps not fully recognized) in many 
subsequent discussions of his views on data models.  Even Giere, in the same (1999) paper 
that challenges Suppes’ instantial account of theoretical models, has a section on “Models 
and Data” where he endorses Suppes’ notions of models of data, and related hierarchy, 
without extending his critique.  The same elision happens in Sabina Leonelli’s (2016) 
discussion of Suppes’ models of data in her book on Data-Centric Biology.7   
 The Suppesian construal of data models as set-theoretic (or other abstract 
mathematical) structures, however, is not innocuous.  It leaves the relation between data 
models and the world at best unanalyzed, and at worst erased.  As Katherine Brading and 
Elaine Landry have argued:  
The term 'model' in science is, of course, replete with connotations of representation, 
and the temptation in the past has perhaps been for the semantic view of theories, with 
its use of Tarskian models (which, to repeat, are truth makers and not representations), 
to piggyback on this required representational role.  In our view this is not acceptable 
(Brading and Landry 2006, p. 577). 
Drawing on the distinction between presentation and representation, they contend that the 
relation between data models and the world cannot be captured solely in terms of the 
presentation of shared structure.  The concern is that the Suppesian notion of data model, in 
 
7 In her more recent work Leonelli (2019) indicates that her views on Suppes’ notion of a 
data model have begun to shift (p. 25, fn 31).  
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resting on the notion of models as truth makers (not representations) gives no account of how 
data models are about the world.8   
 Indeed, a consequence of Suppes' approach to data models, as Roman Frigg and 
James Nguyen point out, is that "[theoretical] models don’t represent planets, atoms, or 
populations; they represent data that are gathered when performing measurements on planets, 
atoms, or populations" (Frigg and Nguyen 2017, pp. 71-72).  Yet we want our scientific 
theories and models to tell us about the world, not just about the abstract, formal structure of 
our data; no matter how many rungs we have in our data model hierarchy, at some point we 
need our ladder to reach the ground.   
This problem becomes particularly acute in some recent incarnations of Suppes' view, 
such as Bas van Fraassen's scientific structuralism, where the relation between data models 
and the world is not just unaccounted for, but in effect erased. The easiest way to see this is 
through van Fraassen's own example of a deer population, which he presents as follows. 
Suppose that I have represented the growth of the deer population in Princeton with a graph, 
and that theory T provides models that fit well with the structure displayed in the graph.  
Someone might object, however, that what we are really interested in is the fit of the theory 
with the actual deer population in the world, not just with the graph of our data.  van Fraassen 
here responds: 
[T]here is no leeway for me in this context, short of withdrawing my graph altogether.  
Since this is my representation of the deer population growth, there is for me no 
difference between the question of whether T fits the graph and the question whether 
T fits the deer population growth. (van Fraassen 2008, p. 256; emphasis original) 
In other words, for the scientist who accepts a data model as her data model, there is a kind of 
identification of the data model (e.g., the structure indicated by the deer population graph) 
and the world (the structure of the actual population of deer in Princeton), such that the 
distinction between them is collapsed.  The question of how—or how well—the data model 
represents the world can no longer be broached.   
van Fraassen is quite aware that one might object to this move and appropriately 
labels it the Loss of Reality Objection (2008, p. 258).  He tries to dissolve the objection by 
arguing that there is a "pragmatic tautology" between a theoretical model adequately 
representing the world and it adequately representing the data model—a move which has 
been criticized by James Nguyen (2016).  We too reject this move; as we illustrate in later 
 
8 As should be clear, in this paper we are rejecting the semantic view of theories and 
concomitant Tarskian view of models, as it is an inadequate account of both theoretical 
models and data models for the sorts of scientific cases we are interested in.   
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sections, scientists are not only able to—but in fact routinely do—draw a meaningful 
distinction between their data models and the world.  Indeed, the iterative process of trying to 
find ways to correct the data and better bridge this gap is a central component of scientific 
practice.   
 Our aim here is not to offer a comprehensive analysis or critique of Suppes’ and van 
Fraassen's accounts, but simply to point out that the common, superficial endorsement of 
their views on data models has been far too sanguine.  Like the mirror view of data, an 
abstract structuralist set-theoretic view of data is limited in its ability to make sense of 
scientific practice.  What is needed instead is a view of data that leaves room for both the 
researcher and the world—as well as the complex iterative interplay between them—in 
constructing data about the world.  We now attempt to offer such a view. 
 
3. The pragmatic-representational (PR) view of data 
In this section we introduce the key elements of our PR view of data, beginning first 
with a discussion of data and data models as representations that are products of a process of 
inquiry (Section 3.1).  Next we turn to the issue of data quality, advocating an adequacy-for-
purpose approach to data evaluation (Section 3.2).  Finally, we illustrate these elements of 
our PR view of data with an example from climate science (Section 3.3). 
3.1 Data as representations 
We understand data to be records of the results of a process of inquiry that involves 
interacting with the world.  These records can take various forms—computer files storing 
numerical values, inscriptions on paper, photographs, etc.9  Researchers collect, select and 
use data that they have reason to believe can, perhaps with further processing and 
manipulation, be informative about aspects of the world that interest them.  Usually, the 
 
9 This view is narrower than that of Leonelli (2016), insofar as Leonelli counts as data any 
material artefact that is taken to be potential evidence for one or more claims about 
phenomena. Thus, for example, she allows that a mice colony could constitute data, if it is 
taken as potential evidence for claims about a link between genes and behaviour. We prefer 
to maintain a distinction between a system or phenomenon that is under study (e.g. the mice 
colony) and data about those phenomena or systems (e.g., records of the observed behavior of 
the mice). Woodward (2010) allows that both the results of a process of inquiry (e.g., an 
instrument state) and a record of those results (which can itself be considered a result) can be 
data; this is broader than our characterization but narrower than Leonelli’s.  We do not think 
a tremendous amount hangs on which of these characterizations one chooses. The choice 
does not, for instance, prevent our reaching a number of other conclusions about data and 
data models that align with those of Leonelli, Woodward and others (see citations throughout 
our discussion). 
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expectation that data can be informative in this way is grounded in the belief that the aspects 
of the world that are of interest have played some causal role in generating the results that the 
data are meant to document (see also Woodward 2010, p. 793; Leonelli 2019).  This does not, 
of course, rule out that other factors, such as features of the instruments, observers, and 
environmental conditions, have also played a role in the production of the data.  Indeed, 
recognizing the influence of these additional factors is often crucial to the evaluation and 
effective use of data, as we will show repeatedly in what follows. 
Data are representational in at least the minimal sense that they are taken to be about 
one or more aspects of the world, namely, those thought to be involved in a particular process 
of inquiry. In most cases, however, conventions of interpretation, metadata, or simply 
familiarity with the process by which the data were produced, will lead a researcher to 
attribute more specific representational content to the data. For example, the numerical value 
“35” inscribed in a weather station’s log book is understood by a meteorologist to represent 
the depth of water (in millimeters) contained in a particular rain gauge at a given time, as 
recorded by a particular observer.  It might also be understood to represent the depth of 
rainfall that fell in that location over a certain period, since that is what rain gauges are 
designed to measure.   
Such representational content will have a certain level of accuracy: it will be closer to 
or farther from the “true value”, however this might be understood (see Tal 2011; Teller 
2018).  Following the standard analogy, if we think of the true value as the bullseye of a 
dartboard, then accuracy is how close to the bullseye the dart (measured value) lands.  It will 
also have a certain resolution: data reporting rain gauge collections to the nearest millimeter 
have finer resolution than data reporting only to the nearest centimeter.  Continuing the 
analogy, resolution refers to how thin or thick the point of the dart is.  We can also speak of 
the precision of the process of inquiry that generates the data: how closely the results of 
repeated applications of that process would cluster together.10  One can have high precision 
with low accuracy, such as when a number of darts land closely together in a small region of 
the dartboard that is far from the bullseye.  Depending on the question that researchers seek 
to answer with the data, a certain minimum level of precision, accuracy, or resolution might 
be required.   
 
10 Precision thus is a property of the process of inquiry, while accuracy is a property of data 
themselves.  
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Data are representational, but this does not mean that they can only be informative 
about one aspect of the world, such as that intended by the original data collector or that 
which they represent if taken at face value according to conventions of interpretation.  For 
example, if the amount of rain collected by a rain gauge is influenced by both the actual 
rainfall and the ambient windspeed, then a datum reporting that collected amount has the 
potential to be informative about either of these aspects of the world.  One meteorologist 
might use a wind-loss equation, in conjunction with data on windspeed, to correct the rain 
gauge reading for wind effects and arrive at a more accurate estimate of rainfall; another 
meteorologist who already has a highly accurate estimate of that rainfall might use the rain 
gauge reading, in conjunction with the same wind-loss equation, to estimate the average wind 
speed during the rainfall. An interfering factor for the first meteorologist (i.e., wind) is the 
target of inquiry for the second.   
As this example suggests, and as Leonelli (2019, p. 17) has emphasized, data do not 
have fixed evidential value.  What data are taken to provide evidence about can change from 
context to context, depending on the interests, background knowledge, and other resources 
available to researchers.  Indeed, the evidential capacity of data can often be extended far 
beyond what was envisioned by the initial data collector (see also Section 5.2 below), as 
scientific knowledge develops over time, as researchers learn about additional factors that 
influenced the data, or as the data can be related to additional quantities of interest in a 
systematic way.  Nonetheless, the evidential value of data is still constrained by the fact that 
they are the product of a particular set of causal factors and not others.  We cannot reasonably 
take rain gauge data to provide evidence about the mass of a distant asteroid, for example. 
Researchers sometimes distinguish between “raw data” on the one hand and “data 
models” or “data products” on the other.  While “raw data” is often taken to mean 
“unprocessed” outputs of instruments or observing procedures, this way of thinking is 
increasingly challenged as instruments themselves embed more and more computational 
processing, from averaging to theory-based calculations (see e.g. Humphreys 2013, 2014). 
Moreover, in practice, such terminology frequently tracks not an absolute or intrinsic 
difference, but a relative one: datasets that are taken as input to a given study might be 
considered “raw” data, even if they are the product of substantial prior processing; when the 
data then undergo further processing (e.g., synthesizing, filtering, correcting, or smoothing) 
in order to make them better serve the study’s aims, the researchers consider the result to be a 
data model or data product.  In the present discussion, we will generally avoid talk of “raw” 
data.  We will understand “data models” to refer to datasets or other entities—graphs, charts, 
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equations, etc.—that are produced by processing other data or data models.  Following 
practitioners, we will sometimes use the label data product for a data model whose 
production has involved substantive processing, such as a transformation from one physical 
quantity to another, or the filling in of gaps using theoretical calculation, or the synthesis of 
data with simulation output.   
Like data themselves, data models are representations.11  Suppose the rainfall datum 
mentioned above is corrected for loss due to wind effects, with the aim of arriving at a more 
accurate estimate of rainfall depth.  The wind-corrected estimate—a representation of rainfall 
depth, say 41 mm—might then be considered a data model, as could a dataset consisting of a 
time series of such corrected estimates, or even a graph obtained by plotting those estimates 
and fitting a curve (e.g., a line) to them; the latter might be taken to represent the contribution 
of a particular causal factor to changes in rainfall in the locale during the period.  As the latter 
example suggests, data models often are constructed with the intention of making salient one 
or more patterns in a collection of data, where the patterns are associated with real-world 
phenomena about which the researcher is seeking evidence (Leonelli 2019).  
While this constructive aspect of data practice is particularly salient in the context of 
data modeling, it is important to keep in mind the earlier point that even “raw” data are 
“made” (Leonelli 2016) through a process of inquiry, which itself is often carefully and 
deliberately designed (see also Tal 2012).  There is a tendency to forget that data are, at least 
in this sense, constructed; instead, as noted in Section 2, data often are treated as unmediated 
windows on the world and consequently are granted some automatic epistemic privilege.12  
The PR approach embraces the view that all data are constructed through a process of 
inquiry; however, we reject a more radical constructive thesis that would claim data are 
purely made-in-the-mind or have their contents freely chosen by scientists.13  We simply 
want to keep in view what should be an uncontroversial fact: that data are the product of an 
interaction between a measuring device (or observer) and the world, and that both these, 
 
11 Leonelli (2019) grants that data models can be representations, but denies that data 
themselves are (in general) representations; hence she takes a slightly different view than we 
do here, as noted above. 
12 For an analysis of the epistemology of theoretical models with an emphasis on how models 
are constructed, see Boon 2020. The constructed nature of theoretical models (as opposed to 
data and data models) seems less often forgotten, though even in the case of theoretical 
models there is sometimes talk of the ‘fallacy of misplaced concreteness’ (Whitehead 1925), 
in which abstract objects like models are treated as, or mistaken for, reality. 
13 Data collected by introspection alone may be a special case; we will not worry about it 
here. 
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along with background conditions and the means by which data are recorded, can influence 
the content and character of the data produced.  Data collection procedures are often carefully 
designed to manage these interactions so that sought-after information is obtained, but they 
are not always successful.  
Thus, in contrast to the unmediated-window or mirror view of data, the PR view 
allows that data and data models can—and indeed often do—misrepresent aspects of the 
world to some extent.  That is, they represent aspects of the world as being somewhat 
different from how they actually are.  The recorded rain gauge reading of “35”, for example, 
might be a significant underestimate of the actual rainfall, due to wind loss; a wind-corrected 
value might be a slight overestimate of the actual rainfall, due to idealized assumptions of the 
correction procedure.  Of course, even when data do misrepresent the world in salient ways, 
they might still be used coherently and successfully to answer particular questions of interest.  
Continuing with the rainfall example, the meteorologist who knows that her uncorrected rain 
gauge reading (representing a rainfall depth of 35 mm) is an underestimate of the true rainfall 
can nevertheless use that datum to successfully answer the question of whether more than 10 
mm of rain fell.  Likewise, if she knows that her wind-corrected data model (representing a 
rainfall depth of 41 mm) is an overestimate of the rainfall, she can still use that data model to 
successfully answer the question of whether more than 100 mm of rain fell.  
As this example illustrates, a scientist who selects and uses a data model in her 
research does not have to accept that data model as her representation in the way suggested 
by van Fraassen (2008; see Section 2 above). That is, she does not have to accept the data 
model as a representation that, for her, is pragmatically indistinguishable from the world.  
Indeed, it is a mark of a good scientist that she explicitly acknowledges—and even tries to 
quantify—the limited accuracy, resolution and precision of her data.  In the case of accuracy, 
this is often done with error-bars around the data points on a graph or, when data are 
presented in numerical format, by reporting them +/- some amount, indicating the associated 
uncertainty.  Van Fraassen (2008) recognizes that data models often incorporate such 
uncertainty information. But the problem remains: even a scientist who uses a data model that 
incorporates uncertainty information need not treat that data model as pragmatically 
indistinguishable from the world, since uncertainty estimates themselves are often recognized 
to be imperfect too—due to idealizations and simplifications employed in the uncertainty 
estimation procedure, or because some sources of uncertainty have not been taken into 
account yet, etc.  
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3.2 Data adequacy-for-purpose 
It remains to articulate the pragmatic dimension of the PR view. A number of 
philosophers have argued that the evaluation of theoretical models should consider not how 
close those models come to ‘mirroring’ real-world target systems but rather whether they 
represent their targets with sufficient accuracy in the respects that are relevant, given the 
purpose at hand (e.g., Teller 2001, Parker 2010).  What matters, on this view, is that a model 
is adequate for the purpose of interest.  Recent work in this vein has emphasized that it is not 
only how theoretical models represent their targets that can determine whether they are 
adequate for purposes of interest, but also other features of such models, such as their 
adaptability, their intelligibility, how computationally-demanding they are, and so on (Elliott 
and McKaughan 2014; Parker 2020a).  
We propose that the same “adequacy-for-purpose" perspective be adopted when 
evaluating data and data models.14  On this way of thinking, the quality of some data or data 
model is relative to one or more purposes of interest; the question is not whether data are 
“good” or “bad”, where this is simply a matter of how close they come to perfectly mirroring 
reality, but rather whether they can be used to achieve the particular epistemic or practical 
aims that interest their users. The aims we have in mind are typically rather specific and 
circumscribed: determining how much rain fell last week in a given locale; testing a 
hypothesis about which of two species emerged first; uncovering patterns of bias in hiring 
practices at a particular set of companies; and so on.15  Data evaluation, on this view, is an 
activity that seeks to determine whether a given dataset or data model is adequate for 
specified purposes, or to better understand the range of purposes for which it is adequate.  
While this view of data evaluation has been advocated in some scientific contexts, it has only 
begun to be examined by philosophers.  For example, Bokulich (2018) in defending such a 
view, quotes paleobiologists who have explicitly recommended an adequacy-for-purpose 
approach when it comes to evaluating fossil data: “palaeontologists, like other scientists, 
 
14 To be clear, we are not making an argument based on an analogy with theoretical models;  
our claim is that features of data and data models themselves speak in favor of adopting the 
adequacy-for-purpose view.     
15 This can be contrasted with generic aims or purposes, such as “predicting” or “explaining” 
or “discovering new phenomena” or “making good decisions”. A further issue is whether 
some epistemic or practical aims should be considered illicit or out-of-bounds, e.g. if the aim 
is to use data to mislead people or coerce or manipulate them. We do not have space to 
address this here; we assume in the present discussion that the purposes of interest are 
standard scientific ones, consistent with the scientific values of knowledge production, 
understanding, truth, etc. 
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should accept that their data are patchy and incomplete, and use appropriate methods to deal 
with this issue in each analysis. All that matters is whether the data are adequate for a 
designated study or not.” (Benton et al. 2011, emphasis in original).16  We urge that this 
perspective be adopted much more widely. 
A basic question that such a view must address, however, is what it means for data to 
be adequate for a purpose.  As Parker (2020a) notes, there are different senses in which a tool 
or resource can be adequate for a purpose. Here we present just two varieties of adequacy-
for-purpose that we believe are often of interest: adequate-in-an-instance (adequacyI) and 
adequate-given-resources (adequacyR).  The first, adapted from Parker’s discussion, is 
concerned with a particular envisioned or actual use of data: a dataset or data model D is 
adequateI-for-P just in case the use of D in instance I would (or would be very likely to) 
result in the achievement of P.  Note that any instance of use of a dataset or data model will 
involve one or more users U and some way W of using the data, i.e., a methodology.  To 
illustrate, suppose the purpose of interest is P1: estimating annual rainfall in a locale to within 
10%.  Though rain gauges are imperfect collectors of rain, if a meteorologist (U) simply adds 
together (W) the weekly rain gauge records (D) at her disposal, she might nevertheless obtain 
an annual rainfall estimate that is accurate to within 8% in that instance.  That accuracy, since 
it is within 10%, is sufficient for her purpose and she would achieve her aim in that instance 
(the dataset D would be adequateI for P1).  But if her purpose had been P2: estimating annual 
rainfall to within 5%, then that dataset D would not have been adequateI for that purpose.  
Whether the dataset is an adequate representation of rainfall at that location is not just an 
intrinsic property of the dataset, but rather depends on how it will be used and for what 
purpose.  
A second variety of adequacy relates to the possibility of using data successfully, 
given a set of accessible resources: a dataset or data model D is adequateR-for-P just in case 
its user U has access to informational, technological, cognitive and practical resources R, 
such that there is some coherent way W that U could use D to achieve purpose P.  The 
aforementioned rain gauge records might be adequateR-for-P2 if the meteorologist (U) has 
access to sufficiently-accurate data on wind speed over the year and a sufficiently-reliable 
equation relating gauge loss to wind speed (R), which she could apply to correct the gauge 
data for wind loss (W).  That is, it is possible, given the resources available to her, for her to 
use the rain gauge data in a coherent way to successfully achieve the more demanding level 
 
16 See also Zumwald et al. (2020) in the context of climate science. 
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of accuracy required by P2.  Thus, data that are inadequateI for a given purpose might still be 
adequateR for that purpose. 
The closely-related concept of fitness-for-purpose can also be employed in data 
evaluation, when the purpose of interest is one that can be achieved to a greater or lesser 
extent, such as P3: accurately estimating annual rainfall in this locale over the previous 
month.  Again following Parker (2020a), we can think of such purposes as consisting of a 
rank-ordered set of achievements, P = {Pmin,…,Pmax}, where Pmin corresponds to achieving P 
to an extent that the evaluator considers minimally-acceptable and Pmax corresponds to 
achieving P to the maximally-desired extent (e.g. a perfectly accurate rainfall estimate, in the 
example given here). The fitnessx-for-purpose of some dataset or data model D for purpose P 
is higher to the extent that D is adequatex for higher-ranking members of the set P, where x 
picks out some variety of adequacy (e.g. adequacyI, adequacyR, etc.).17    
Note that whether some dataset or data model is adequate-for-purpose in the senses 
articulated above depends not just on how it represents the world (i.e., a representational 
target), but on whether it stands in a suitable relationship with that representational target, a 
data user, a methodology (or set of available methodologies/resources), and background 
circumstances jointly.  These can be thought of as dimensions of a problem space, in which 
the goal is to achieve the purpose P of interest (Parker ibid.). 18  The different dimensions 
constrain, and in some cases determine, what properties data and data models need to have if 
they are to be adequate-for-purpose. These properties include—but are not limited to—the 
accuracy (and precision and resolution) with which data and data models represent some 
aspect of the world.  Depending on the purpose, they can also include, for example, whether 
data are easily portable, whether they are accompanied by particular metadata, whether their 
format makes relevant patterns salient to users with particular cognitive abilities and 
background knowledge, etc. The latter, for instance, might be very important if a dataset or 
data model is to be inspected by users who seek to develop explanations of phenomena; users 
 
17 Given that fitness-for-purpose is analyzed in terms of adequacy-for-purpose, most of the 
remainder of our discussion will be framed just in terms of adequacy-for-purpose, for 
simplicity. 
18 As hinted above, the notions of adequacy-for-purpose offered here can easily be adapted 
for evaluation of methodologies and perhaps other entities/resources too. That is, we could 
ask whether a methodology is adequate-for-purpose, given a data user, a dataset and the 
circumstances in which the methodology will be deployed. This seems close to what Mayo 
(2018, p.297) has in mind when she speaks of the “adequacy for a problem” of statistical 
modeling assumptions and techniques in the context of data modeling. 
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need to be able to ‘see’ the relevant explanatory information if they are to succeed in 
achieving their purpose.  
 
3.3 Illustrating the PR view 
The simple rain gauge example above is useful for introducing the PR view. 
However, since most uses of data in science are not so simple, in this section we illustrate key 
elements of the PR view with a more complex example from scientific practice.   
Shaun Marcott and colleagues (2013) developed the first reconstruction of the 
evolution of global temperature over the Holocene period, from 11,300 years ago to the 
present.  They started from published temperature reconstructions for 73 sites around the 
globe, produced from a variety of proxy indicators, including marine and terrestrial fossils, 
isotopes in lake and ocean sediments, ice cores, etc.  These temperature records, each of 
which spanned most or all of the Holocene, were in some cases recalibrated by Marcott et al. 
to reflect updated methods for converting radiocarbon dates to calendar dates.19  A Monte-
Carlo methodology was then used to generate 1000 realizations of each record, linearly 
interpolated to constant time spacing; each realization constituted a possible evolution of 
temperature at the site, given uncertainties associated with dating the proxy indicators and 
inferring temperatures from them.  These were combined to produce 1000 reconstructions of 
global temperature evolution over the Holocene.  Calculating the mean and standard 
deviation for these 1000 global reconstructions produced a best-estimate reconstruction and 
an estimate of its associated uncertainty, respectively. From this, Marcott et al. also estimated 
the statistical distribution of global temperature during the Holocene period. These steps were 
repeated with different methodological choices (e.g., different ways of combining the local 
reconstructions to arrive at a global one) to test the sensitivity of the results.20   
From the perspective of the PR view, we can see several layers of representation in 
the Marcott et al. study.  The key outputs of the study were two types of data products that 
represented (a) the evolution of global temperature over the course of the Holocene and (b) 
the statistical distribution of global temperature during that period, inferred from (a).  As 
explained above, these were constructed in a complex way from a set of already-available 
 
19 For a philosophical discussion of the recalibration of radiocarbon dates see Chapman and 
Wylie (2016) or Bokulich (2020a). 
20 This is a simplified account of the methodology; a more detailed description can be found 
in the published paper and in a subsequent FAQ post on the blog RealClimate. See 
http://www.realclimate.org/index.php/archives/2013/03/response-by-marcott-et-al/ 
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data products, each representing the evolution of temperature in a particular locale. Each of 
these data products, in turn, was ultimately developed (perhaps with several additional layers 
of data modeling in between) from data representing particular features of fossils or 
sediments or ice cores, etc; the transformation of these data about fossils into data about 
temperature was a crucial first step.  
Considerations of adequacy-for-purpose figured prominently in both the published 
paper and subsequent discussion of it in the blogosphere.  A key aim of the Marcott et al. 
study was to determine how unusual recent global temperatures are, relative to the rest of the 
Holocene (a particular purpose P).  As Marcott et al. say: “Because the relatively low 
resolution and time uncertainty of our data sets should generally suppress higher-frequency 
temperature variability, an important question is whether the Holocene stack adequately 
represents centennial- or millennial-scale variability” (p. 1198, emphases added).  The 
concern was that, if high-frequency variability was smoothed over too much, then the 
analysis might substantially overestimate the extent to which recent global temperatures are 
unusual, relative to the rest of the Holocene.  To probe this, Marcott et al. applied their 
reconstruction methodology to synthetic data containing high-frequency variability, allowing 
them to estimate the extent to which such variability would be missed.21  This led to a revised 
estimate of the statistical distribution of temperature over the Holocene period, which took 
account of this estimated missing variability.  Using this revised data product, they concluded 
that recent temperatures were warmer than during ~72% of the Holocene, rather than during 
~82% of it, as implied by their standard reconstruction.  Here we see researchers focusing 
their evaluative and corrective efforts on particular aspects of their data modeling procedure 
that might render their data products inadequate for the purpose at hand (P); with a different 
purpose of interest, attention might well have been focused on other aspects of the data and 
data products. 
The Marcott et al. study thus exemplifies three important elements of the PR view: the 
representational character of data and data models; the fact that they are not ‘given’ but 
rather constructed through a process of inquiry that in many cases is quite complex; and a 
focus, when evaluating data and data models, on their adequacy for particular purposes of 
interest.  
 
 
21 For a discussion of how synthetic data can be used to test the adequacy of data correction 
methods, see Bokulich (2018) and Parker (2020b).   
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4. Three Implications for Data Evaluation 
Having introduced the basic elements of the pragmatic-representational (PR) view of 
data, we next want to highlight three important implications for data assessment in practice, 
related to misrepresentation (Section 4.1), context-sensitivity (Section 4.2) and 
complementary use (Section 4.3).  
 
4.1 Misrepresentation  
A clear implication of the PR view is that, when evaluating data, the fact that they 
misrepresent aspects of the world in various ways should not automatically “count against” 
them; misrepresentation is problematic only if it renders data inadequate for the researcher’s 
purposes.  Philosophers advocating a pragmatic, representational perspective on theoretical 
modeling have emphasized the same point in that context (e.g., van Fraassen 2008; Bokulich 
2016; Parker 2020a).  Just as misrepresentation need not render a theoretical model 
inadequate for a purpose of interest, it need not render data inadequate either; having data that 
represent the world in a highly-accurate way is not always necessary.  This point is more 
familiar today than ever, with the rise of “big data” and machine learning methods.  Such 
methods often succeed in extracting relationships that are useful for predictive purposes, even 
when the data stream under analysis is noisy, error-ridden, etc.  Here, the sheer volume of the 
data allows the algorithm to learn some useful predictive relationships, despite far-from-
perfect data.   
Examples can readily be found in more traditional scientific contexts as well.  
Suppose a scientist wants to test the hypothesis that the non-avian dinosaurs went extinct due 
to an asteroid impact (P).  She plans to do so by seeing whether the two events are temporally 
coincident according to radiometric dating of samples associated with the two events.  
Testing for the coincidence of the two events does not require that estimates of their absolute 
ages (i.e., measured in calendar years) be highly accurate.  Data from a single high-precision 
dating method that can be applied to both the extinction event and the impact event could 
suffice; systematic biases in that dating method (such as an incorrect value for the relevant 
decay constant) could skew the absolute ages of the events, making them off by several 
million years, but as long as both ages reflect the same systematic offset, the question of 
whether they are temporally coincident could still be successfully answered (for a discussion 
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of precision and accuracy in radiometric methods see Bokulich 2020a).  The radiometric data 
would be adequate for the researcher’s purpose, despite their significant inaccuracy.22 
In fact, there can be reasons to choose a less-accurate and/or lower-resolution dataset 
over a more-accurate, higher-resolution one.  Sometimes the reasons are pragmatic: an 
answer to a question is needed in a particular time frame, and a good-enough answer can be 
obtained more quickly from the less-accurate or lower-resolution data (see Elliott and 
McKaughan 2014 for a similar point).  Indeed, the more-accurate, higher-resolution data may 
be inadequate for the researcher’s purpose, insofar as it is infeasible for the researcher to 
analyze or process the data on the timescale required.  In other cases, reasons for choosing a 
less-accurate, lower-resolution dataset can stem from the cognitive capacities or limited 
background knowledge of the data users.  Such a preference is especially plausible, for 
instance, when it comes to using data for pedagogical or explanatory purposes.  This is 
analogous to the way in which simpler theoretical models can be preferable when the aim is 
explanation and understanding of the behavior of complex systems and phenomena, because 
the simple models’ behavior is easier for researchers to explain and understand (e.g., 
Bokulich 2008; Parker 2014; Kuorikoski and Ylikoski 2015). 
Of course, this is not to deny the general value of having data whose accuracy, 
precision and resolution are high.  Such “high-fidelity” data can be expected to be adequate 
for a broad range of purposes.  The point is simply that higher-fidelity data are not always 
preferable; lower-fidelity data can sometimes have greater fitness-for-purpose. 
 
4.2 Evaluation in context 
A second significant implication of the PR view is that data cannot be evaluated 
independently of their context of use.  The point here is not just that evaluations of data 
quality can vary with the purpose of interest; as we emphasized in Section 3.2, the properties 
that data need to have if they are to be adequate depend on other dimensions of the problem 
space as well, notably the methodology that the data user will employ (or the set of 
methodologies available to her) and, in some cases, the user’s cognitive and other abilities. 
An analogous observation is made by Parker (2020a), when advocating an adequacy-for-
purpose view in the context of theoretical model evaluation; she argues that, while some 
 
22 If instead the researcher used data from two different radiometric methods (e.g., an argon-
argon date and a uranium-lead date) for the two different events, and those dating methods 
had different systematic biases, then the data would not be adequate for establishing the 
coincidence of the two events. 
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philosophers have suggested that model quality is purpose-relative (e.g. Teller 2001; Giere 
2004), under an adequacy-for-purpose view it is relative to a broader problem space.  
Among other things, this context-relativity of data quality means that often one cannot 
"read off” from a purpose alone a set of properties that the data or data models must have if 
they are to be “good enough”.  For example, if our aim is to order days of a month from most 
to least rainfall, it does not follow that we need data that, when taken at face value, produce 
the correct ordering; the ordering implied by the data might be quite inaccurate, due to some 
rainy days being very windy and others not, yet those data could still be adequate for our 
purpose if our methodological toolbox includes a means of correcting for wind loss.  This 
point is closely related to Tal’s (2012) challenge to van Fraassen’s (2008) “criterion for the 
physical correlate of measurement.” Tal illustrates how the same state of a measuring 
apparatus can be mapped to different measurement outcomes, depending on assumed 
background conditions, known interfering factors, and so on.  Depending on the mapping 
procedure (i.e., the methodology) to be employed—part of the context of use—the properties 
that data and data models will need to have to be “good enough” for a given purpose might 
well vary. Similarly, it can depend on other dimensions of the problem space, including the 
data user and the background circumstances in which the data will be used. 
4.3 Complementary uses  
A third important implication of the PR view is that data and data models representing 
the same aspects of the world need not be seen as competitors.  Once again, this parallels the 
situation in theoretical modeling, where different models of the same target system need not 
be in competition with one another; they might be useful for different purposes or might be 
complementary in various other ways (e.g., Parker 2006, Bokulich 2013).  Here we discuss 
two ways in which datasets representing the same aspects of the world also can be 
complementary.   
First, like theoretical models, datasets that represent the same aspects of the world can 
be suited to different purposes.  Consider two national rainfall datasets that have different 
spatial resolution; the high-resolution data might be required for quantifying changes in 
rainfall in particular cities, while the somewhat lower-resolution data might be preferable for 
discerning broad patterns of change at regional scales (e.g., due to the data’s being easier to 
work with or avoiding unnecessary detail, etc.). Ideally, these datasets would be consistent 
with one another, in the sense that regional-scale rainfall that is inferred using the high-
resolution dataset would be within the uncertainty bounds associated with the estimate 
inferred from the lower-resolution dataset, but even this is not strictly necessary for the 
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datasets to be complementary resources, where each is better than the other for some 
purposes.    
Second, datasets and data models that represent the same aspects of the world can be 
complementary insofar as they jointly serve a particular purpose.  For example, a set of data 
products, each representing the evolution of paleoclimatic temperatures but developed from 
different types of proxy indicators (e.g., tree rings vs. ice cores), can provide valuable insight 
into the extent of current uncertainty about those past temperatures.  The same is true of sets 
of data products representing the evolution of 20th century global temperatures, which are 
produced from the same thermometer data, but with different methodologies for processing 
those data: “Multiple [data] products are the only conceivable way to get even a simple 
estimate of the structural (methodological choices) uncertainty; we need to attack the problem 
from many different a priori assumptions to create an ensemble of estimates” (Thorne et al. 
2011, p. ES44).  In cases like these, the alternative data models are used together for a single 
purpose, namely, uncertainty exploration or quantification.  Consequently, their evaluation 
should focus on how well they together serve this purpose. 
 
5. The Dynamics of Data: Reusing and Repurposing 
Our discussion so far has centered on the use and evaluation of data at a given point in 
time.  Importantly, however, neither the assessment of data adequacy nor the choice of 
purpose need be static.  Efforts can be made to help data better serve a particular purpose, and 
the range of purposes for which data are adequate can evolve over time as new knowledge 
and techniques become available.  Here we describe these “dynamics of data” in terms of the 
concepts of data reuse and repurposing.23  By data reuse (Section 5.1) we mean using data 
again for essentially the same purpose for which it was used previously.  Reuse involves a 
reexamination, reanalysis, or reprocessing of a data set with the aim of better answering a 
question already addressed by those data.  By contrast, data repurposing (Section 5.2) is 
using pre-existing data for a different purpose than was initially envisioned by the data 
collectors or primary data users.  
 
23 Although the terms “data reuse” and “data repurpose” are sprinkled throughout the data 
science literature, there does not appear to be any firm consensus in how either of these terms 
is used, including whether they are synonymous (e.g., compare Zimmerman 2008, Berman 
2015, Woodall & Wainman 2015, and van de Sandt 2019).  Here we take them to be 
conceptually distinct, as we explain. 
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There are various reasons why scientists might reuse or repurpose data.  Reuse 
sometimes stems from an interest in whether the results of a study can be replicated or 
reproduced.  Even if no errors per se were made, new (or different) data modelling techniques 
might yield better results for the purpose of interest (e.g., might allow for a clearer signal to 
be extracted from noisy data, even if the basic conclusion of the study is unchallenged).  
Moreover, some data sources are ephemeral; a particular hurricane, for example, lasts only so 
long, after which there is no possibility of re-observing it.  In the case of repurposing, the 
impetus is often simply the recognition that additional, interesting scientific questions can 
fruitfully be addressed using existing data.  More generally, considerations of efficiency often 
play a role: data collection can be very expensive, difficult, and time-consuming, making the 
reuse or repurposing existing data an attractive option.   
These reasons help to explain the tremendous push of many scientific, grant, and 
government agencies towards open data principles, which require that scientists make their 
data freely available online in community databases, such as the Paleobiology Database, the 
Cancer Imaging Archive, HEPData, or NASA's EarthData.  These community databases 
allow for multiple reuses and repurposings of the data, as well as the integration of many 
different data sources by users.  Similarly, the growing movement to rescue so-called “legacy 
data” or “dark data” only makes sense in light of the dynamic reusing and repurposing of 
data.  Legacy data are those whose method of collection or storage inhibits their continued 
use.  To make them usable—either for reuse or repurpose—requires that the data be re-
curated, which can itself involve many steps, such as changing the substrate of the data (e.g., 
from analog to digital), re-standardization, or semantic reinterpretation.  These movements 
(open data, community databases, data rescue) are increasingly facilitating data reuse and 
repurposing across a range of fields.  An important implication of this, we argue, is that data 
sets increasingly have a kind of "evolutionary" history that can be highly relevant to their 
evaluation and use (Section 5.3). 
 
5.1 Data Reuse  
 As defined above, data reuse involves the reexamination, reanalysis, or reprocessing 
of a data set, so that it can be used for essentially the same purpose for which it had 
previously been used.  The aim is usually to arrive at improved data models—ones that are 
more likely to be adequate for the purpose(s) of interest (or that have greater fitness-for-
purpose).  Reuse of data occurs because science itself is a process—a fallible enterprise that 
often increases its epistemic reliability through iteration; this applies no less to data than it 
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does to theory.  Sometimes, reuse is prompted by a change in background theory or 
standards.  For example, Bokulich (2020a) discusses how radiometric data need to be 
periodically reprocessed, as measurement standards and the empirically determined values of 
decay constants change.  Other times, researchers come to recognize that interfering factors 
were not sufficiently controlled for, or adequately corrected for, previously.24  In still other 
cases, new or alternative statistical data processing methods become available, which have 
advantages over those previously used.  Finally, there can be other sorts of data 
enhancements that facilitate the reuse of data for the purpose of interest, such as new methods 
of data interpolation or the integration of the data set with other data sets.  
In fact, in many scientific fields there is an iterative process aimed at data model 
improvement.  Here we present just one example, involving stellar radial velocity (RV) data 
used to detect exoplanets.25  RV data can record changes in the radial component of the 
velocity of a star due to the gravitational pull of an unseen exoplanet; the starlight is blue-
shifted when the star is pulled towards us by the planet and red-shifted when it is pulled 
away.  Initial analysis of RV data collected by the HARPS (High Accuracy Radial velocity 
Planet Searcher) spectrograph at the European Southern Observatory in Chile indicated three 
exoplanets orbiting the red dwarf star Gliese 581 (GJ 581) (Udry et al. 2007).  HARPS data, 
which consisted of 119 velocities collected over 4 years, was reused by Vogt et al. (2010), 
who combined it with another RV dataset obtained from the HIRES spectrograph on the 
Keck I telescope in Hawaii; HIRES data consisted of 122 velocities obtained over 11 years.  
Their analysis of the combined data sets indicated not just three, but six planets orbiting GJ 
581.  They used the two data sets (HIRES and HARPS) not just collectively, but also to probe 
how many of those planets were independently confirmed by each data set, emphasizing that 
"inter-team comparisons on stars like [Gliese 581]. . . will be crucial to quantifying the true 
precision limits of any team's data sets" (ibid).  This illustrates the complementary use of 
multiple datasets about the same target, highlighted in Section 4.3. 
Subsequently, Baluev (2013) reanalyzed the same HARPS and HIRES data and 
argued that they contained a significant correlated red-noise component, which had not been 
accounted for by Vogt et al. (2010).  Since the source of correlation was unknown, the data 
 
24 As Tal (2012) argues, successful measurement requires a model of the measuring process; 
as scientists learn more about their instruments, the world, and the measurement interactions 
between them that produce the data, their model of the measuring process can be refined. 
This can lead to refined or changed understanding of data. 
25 This example is briefly discussed by Berman (2015), p. 67. 
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processing path was bifurcated, producing two datasets reflecting different noise models.  On 
Baluev’s analysis of the noise-corrected data, two of the exoplanets previously thought to 
orbit GJ 581 were deemed artefactual, and the existence of a third (GJ 581 d) became 
uncertain; instead of six exoplanets orbiting GJ 581, there were likely only three or four.  
More recently, building on Baluev's red-noise corrected version of the HARPS and HIRES 
data sets, Robertson et al. (2014) investigated the period of stellar rotation for GJ 581 and 
showed that, when the data are corrected for this stellar activity, the exoplanet d that was 
hanging in the balance effectively disappears, leaving just three planets.  These efforts, which 
involve repeatedly reusing the HARPS and HIRES data sets to answer the same question of 
how many exoplanets are orbiting GJ 581, are still ongoing.  Given questions about these 
methods, Vanderburg et al. (2016) are using computer simulations and synthetic data to 
explore the reliability of various data correction methods that disentangle the RV signal of the 
exoplanets from the signals caused by stellar activity (e.g., due to starspots and stellar 
rotation), learning more as they go.  
 This sort of iterative development of datasets and data models, where the same data 
are re-processed and re-analyzed so that they can better serve a particular purpose of interest, 
can be seen in many other scientific contexts too.  In some cases, it is reflected in the very 
labels given to datasets, marking them as particular versions, as is also commonly done for 
theoretical models (e.g. computer simulation models).  In climate science, for example, 
global temperature datasets are often labeled in this way; successive versions the HadCRUT 
dataset, developed over multiple decades and reflecting various methodological innovations, 
are HadCRUT1, HadCRUT2, HadCRUT3, etc. (see Osborn and Jones 2014).  The ever-
evolving state of scientific, technological, and statistical knowledge means that, even with the 
same data (e.g. HARPS/HIRES) and the same questions being asked of them (How many 
exoplanets are orbiting GJ581?) there can be differences in the conclusions drawn.  The hope 
is that, through iterative reuse, researchers develop data models that better serve the particular 
purposes that interest them—such as determining the number of exoplanets around a star or 
quantifying the warming of Earth’s surface temperature during the 20th century.  
 
5.2 Data Repurposing 
While data reuse involves using the same data to answer the same question, data 
repurposing involves using the same data to answer a different question.  This repurposing 
can take several forms.  First, and most straightforwardly, a data set about some quantity, x, 
can be recognized as adequate for (or at least relevant to) additional x-related purposes, 
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though perhaps requiring some further data wrangling.26  Second, it might turn out, as in the 
case of derived measurement (Parker 2017) or data conversion (Bokulich 2020b), that data 
about quantity x can be converted through well-established laws or relations into estimates of 
another quantity y.  For example, data recording the travel time of light or an acoustic signal 
(t) can be converted into data about distances (km).  Third, even if there is not a direct or 
exact conversion from quantity x to another quantity y, it may be that x can be taken as a 
rough proxy for y.  An example is the use of leaf shapes recorded in fossils as a proxy for 
paleoclimate temperatures, with smoother leaf edges indicating warmer climates and more 
jagged "toothed" leaf edges indicative of cooler climates (e.g., Royer et al. 2005).  In these 
ways, data that were collected with certain purposes in mind can be repurposed to serve 
others.   
 A striking example of this is a recent repurposing of data gathered from the Mars 
rover Curiosity.  Curiosity was equipped with a set of three-axis gyroscopes and 
accelerometers for measuring changes in velocity and orientation—data which together made 
up the rover's Inertial Measurement Units (RIMU) system for navigation.  These data were 
essential for allowing the rover to remain right-side-up and balanced as it moved through the 
steep and rocky Mars terrain.  Curiosity collected these RIMU data and beamed them back to 
Earth as scientists directed the Rover to cross the Gale crater and climb the foothills of Mount 
Sharp.  Geoscientist Kevin Lewis and colleagues (2019) repurposed these data, initially used 
for navigation, in order to help resolve a scientific debate about the origin of Mount Sharp: 
Was the crater initially filled with sediment and then subsequently eroded away leaving 
behind the mountain, or was the crater never filled, and instead the mountain was constructed 
by wind deposition and other processes?  Answering this question required gravimetric 
data—measurements of the gravitational field (g) at different places on the planet's surface—
which could be used to infer the structure and density of the planet's subsurface.  While 
Curiosity's payload was not equipped with a gravimeter, Lewis et al. recalibrated and 
reprocessed the RIMU data, applying corrections for purpose-relevant confounding factors, in 
order to obtain estimates of gravitational changes with elevation.  From these data, Lewis et 
al. inferred that the underlying rock was of low density (high porosity), indicating that the 
crater could not have been buried up to the height of Mount Sharp (5 kilometers), which 
would have resulted in significantly more compactification, and hence higher density.   
 
26 Data wrangling is a general term for activities such as cleaning, structuring, or otherwise 
optimizing a data set for use.   
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 Thus, data initially collected for the purpose of navigation were repurposed for a 
completely different end, that is, for measuring gravitational changes with elevation in order 
to determine the density of subsurface rock.  This illustrates vividly a point made earlier in 
Section 3.1: oftentimes datasets can—if appropriately processed—provide evidence 
regarding a variety of different claims, if the knowledge and other resources needed to extract 
the relevant information is available to the scientist; the evidential value of the data is 
constrained, but certainly not fixed.  From the perspective of the PR view, examples like 
these illustrate that data can be adequate for a wide range of purposes beyond those for which 
they were originally collected.   
 
5.3 A Phylogeny of Data: Trees, Not Hierarchies 
Insofar as data are frequently reused and repurposed, we can expect that datasets and 
data models will often have a kind of evolutionary history or phylogeny.  Their current 
incarnations will be a product of a prior sequence of modifications, as data are produced, 
processed, and reprocessed in different ways.  Some of these modifications will be 
cumulative, while others will bifurcate a data lineage, resulting in datasets being developed 
along different paths as needed to adapt the data for (increase their fitness for) different 
purposes.  Choices made at one stage—such as to smooth data in a particular way or exclude 
particular outliers—will sometimes become “generatively entrenched” (Wimsatt 2007), 
shaping and constraining the future development of those data models.27  If one were to map 
the history of a dataset from its origin as "raw" data at the time of collection, up through its 
various wranglings, corrections, and other modifications to its different uses as evidence, the 
resulting picture would in many cases be a complex, branching tree structure, reflecting the 
evolution of the dataset (or data model) as scientists learn how to best extract the information 
needed for particular purposes.  
Note that the tree structure we are identifying here is different from Suppes's (1962) 
hierarchy of models, discussed briefly in Section 2.  Suppes's hierarchy was concerned with 
the synchronic problem of how a scientific theory relates to the world, or more precisely how 
Tarskian models of theory are related to Tarskian models of the data through a succession of 
intermediary models, such that the two can be compared.  What we are instead calling 
attention to here is the diachronic history of the data models themselves—a process akin to 
 
27 See Lenhard and Winsberg (2010) for a similar point about choices made in the 
development of complex computer simulation models (i.e., a kind of theoretical model). 
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descent with modification, as data are reused and repurposed by various researchers.  
Importantly, on this picture, data models are not simply “made more accurate” as they 
evolve; the respects in which they become more (or perhaps less!) accurate, and more 
generally the ways in which they are changed, are shaped by the particular epistemic and 
practical goals of the researchers involved.28  As we have illustrated, researchers can develop 
a dataset in different ways to serve different purposes.  This can be seen with both the wind-
influenced-rain-gauge dataset, presented in Section 3.1, and the Mars rover dataset 
repurposed for gravimetry data about subsurface density, discussed above.  With different 
purposes of interest, the development of the dataset might focus on correcting for a different 
set of confounders, or might set a different threshold for discarding outlier data, and so on. 
This in turn suggests that information about the historical lineage of a data set—
including any original purpose for which it was collected and any modifications it has 
subsequently undergone—can aid its appropriate use in important ways.  For instance, 
knowing that the original process of data collection was optimized to serve a particular 
purpose can provide insight into which sorts of errors the data collectors might have been 
especially careful to avoid, as well as which other sorts of errors the data are likely to 
contain.29  Ann Zimmerman (2008), in her ethnographic study of ecologists who repurpose 
data that they did not collect themselves, found that these scientists were well aware of the 
value of such information.  She writes, “Ecologists discussed the importance of knowing that 
the purpose for which data were gathered guides appropriate reuse30 of them. . . . Research 
purpose dictates methodological choices, which in turn affects the data that are generated” 
(Zimmerman 2008, p. 642-3).  The purpose for which data are being collected can shape the 
scientist's choice of which measuring instrument and methodology to use in collecting that 
data, and thereby influence the qualities of the data produced.  Hence, in cases where data are 
collected with a particular purpose in mind, this can be valuable information to include in the 
accompanying metadata (i.e., data about data).31  Clearly, awareness of any modifications 
that have been made since the data were originally collected can also be relevant to 
determining whether the dataset, at its present state of development, is adequate for a given 
 
28 This loosely—but only loosely—parallels the way in which the traits selected for in 
biological evolution depend on the environment of the population.  
29 Here too, there are parallels with theoretical models; see e.g. Parker and Winsberg 2018.   
30 Zimmerman uses the term “reuse” to mean what we here call “repurpose” (ibid., p. 634). 
31 Even when researchers claim to have no specific purpose for their data in mind, they 
nonetheless must make choices about what instruments or methods to use in the collection of 
that data, which will influence the character of the dataset.   
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purpose.32.  Indeed, a phylogeny of the data can be invaluable not only for evaluating whether 
a data model, taken at face value, is adequate for a purpose of interest, but also for 
understanding what further data wrangling or enhancement might be required to develop a 
data model that has greater fitness for the purpose that interests us.   
 
 
6. Concluding remarks  
 We have defended a novel pragmatic-representational (PR) view of data and data 
models, which avoids the problematic assumptions of both the naive mirroring view and the 
Suppesian set-theoretic view.  Unlike these commonly-assumed views, the PR perspective 
leaves room for the complex iterative interplay between researchers and the world in 
producing and developing data and data models.  The PR view understands data and data 
models to be representations of various aspects of the world.  Minimally, they are taken to be 
about processes thought to be involved in their production and, in many cases, they have 
more specific representational content.  Recognizing data as representational, however, does 
not commit one to the view that their evidential value is fixed.  As we have illustrated, the 
same data can be informative about various aspects of the world, though which aspects are of 
course constrained by the processes involved in the data’s production.  
 While an adequate epistemology of data must leave room for data to misrepresent, the 
pragmatic element of our PR view emphasizes that misrepresentation is not necessarily 
problematic.  The central insight of the PR view is that data and data models, like theoretical 
models, should be evaluated in terms of their adequacy or fitness for particular purposes, 
rather than relative to some ideal standard of perfect representation.  Moreover, whether data 
are adequate-for-purpose depends not just on how they represent aspects of the world, but 
also on how they relate to other dimensions of a broader problem space, such as the data 
user’s abilities, resources, and the methodology to be employed.   
 The PR view of data is also a dynamic view: neither the assessment of adequacy nor 
the choice of purpose need be fixed.  As we illustrated, a dataset that is inadequate for a given 
purpose when one set of resources is available or employed, can become adequate for that 
purpose with access to additional resources that allow for further data processing, such as 
 
32 Such metadata are important for creating what Nora Boyd (2018) calls "enriched 
evidence", by which she means "evidence enriched by auxiliary information about how those 
lines were generated . . . [including] metadata regarding the provenance of the data records 
and the processing workflow that transforms them" (2018, pp. 406-407). 
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data filtering or data integration.  Researchers often work hard to build improved data 
models—ones that better serve their purposes—from a given set of “raw” data.  In addition to 
this data reuse, data can be repurposed: data that were initially collected for one purpose can 
be retooled, through processes such as data conversion, to serve a range of additional 
purposes.  The upshot of this reusing and repurposing is that datasets often have a kind of 
evolutionary history (or phylogeny), which can be highly relevant to evaluating their 
adequacy or fitness for purposes of interest.  Information about the original purpose for which 
the data were collected, as well as key stages in their lineage (e.g., filtering, processing, etc.), 
can be valuable for future users of the data.  This underscores that such information should be 
included in a dataset's associated metadata.   
 In addition to advancing the philosophy of data, the PR view may also be of use to 
practicing scientists.  First, the PR view urges that scientists think of data not as detached and 
self-sufficient elements of reality, but rather as records of a process of inquiry; hence, their 
origin and history become relevant to their assessment and use in practice.  Second, although 
some scientists take the view that the evaluation of data should be tied to purpose, many seem 
to implicitly subscribe to something like the mirroring view, according to which data are 
evaluated merely as accurate or inaccurate, good or bad, tout court.  A more fruitful 
assessment would take into account the particular planned use of the data, and instead ask 
how various features of the data—not just their accuracy, resolution and precision, but also 
their format, available metadata, previous processing, etc.—bear on their adequacy or fitness 
for that particular purpose.  An explicit recognition of the PR view could thus help avoid 
debates where scientists are speaking past each other in their assessments of data, because 
they have different purposes in mind.  Finally, by recognizing the potential for data models to 
be refined over time—both to better serve existing purposes (reuse) and to be used for 
purposes beyond those for which they were originally collected (repurposing)—our view 
reinforces current movements calling for open data and data rescue.   
 We see numerous opportunities for further research.  One project involves further 
integrating the PR view of data with recent work in the philosophy of measurement 
(metrology), especially the model-based view of measurement developed by Tal (2012).  
Other promising avenues include the following: performing detailed case studies of the ways 
in which adequacy considerations shape choices in data model development; tracing the 
phylogenic histories of important datasets and how their evolution was shaped by 
researchers’ purposes and by other dimensions of the associated problem space; relating these 
evolutionary histories  to emerging discussions of “data journeys” and how data “travel” 
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(Leonelli 2016, 2020); exploring the extent to which distinctive challenges arise when 
evaluating the adequacy of data of different types (e.g., quantitative versus qualitative), in 
different fields (e.g., physics versus sociology), and with respect to different types of purpose 
(e.g., understanding versus prediction); and analyzing particular scientific disputes over data 
through the lens of the PR view.  Through such investigations, our philosophical 
understanding of data and data models can begin to catch up with our understanding of 
theoretical models. 
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